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Abstract 
Enterprise architecture (EA) is a holistic approach that aligns IT resources with business processes and 
strategies. Thus, EA has been used in the public sector to improve services and service processes. How-
ever, when EA programs are initiated, the organization faces several challenges, such as lack of re-
sources or understanding, and radical changes in the organizational structures. In this paper, we study 
these problems in the public sector context and identify their root causes. We conduct a multiple-case 
study by deriving qualitative data from three provinces; each has different experiences, backgrounds, 
and skills. The findings highlight eight generic root causes and several public sector–specific problems. 
These findings help researchers and practitioners understand and promote EA, and avoid as many chal-
lenges as possible as the root causes are known. 
Keywords: enterprise architecture, root causes, problems, public sector. 
 
  
  
 
 
1 INTRODUCTION 
Enterprise architecture (EA) is often seen as a solution to help governments decrease operations costs, 
reduce  corruption, and increase transparency, accountability, and better decision making (Alhujran, 
2009). Consequently, interest in EA in the public sector is receiving increasing attention (Dang & Pek-
kola, 2015). Unfortunately, EA is infamous for a low success rate (Dang & Pekkola, 2015; Kotusev et 
al., 2015; Ojo et al., 2012). However, although studies have investigated the problems in EA programs 
(Chuang & Loggerenberg, 2013; Hauder et al., 2013; Kim & Everest, 1994), the root causes have not 
been studied. Thus, in this study, we examine different problems and identify their root causes to help 
practitioners acknowledge and identify them, reduce EA risks, and ultimately avoid them in EA pro-
grams. Researchers will gain a better understanding of the complexity of the EA phenomena. 
In this paper, we answer the following research question: “What problems exist in EA in the public 
sector, and what are their root causes?” A qualitative multiple-case study utilizes interview data from 
three provinces. The findings indicate that there are eight generic root causes and several public sector–
specific EA problems. This notion is the first step to assist researchers and practitioners in identifying 
risks in EA programs and their implementation, and ultimately avoid them. This would enhance the 
chances for successful EA programs. 
The paper is organized as follows: First, related literature is presented. This section is followed by the 
research methods and settings. The subsequent sections show the findings and their discussion. The 
paper ends with a concluding section. 
2 BACKGROUND 
2.1 Enterprise Architecture  
EA, first introduced in 1987 (Zachman, 1987) lacks a universally accepted definition (Niemi & Pekkola, 
2015; Rohloff, 2005). However, EA is defined as “the organizing logic for business process and IT 
capabilities reflecting the integration and standardization requirements of the firm’s operating model” 
The MIT Center for Information Systems Research (MIT CISR). EA, thus, is a “definition and repre-
sentation of a high-level view of an enterprise‘s business processes and IT systems, their interrelation-
ships, and the extent to which these processes and systems are shared by different parts of the enterprise” 
(Tamm et al., 2011). In other words, EA provides a comprehensive view of an organization’s business 
objectives and processes, data resources, information systems, and technologies—and their relation-
ships.  
EA is often used to manage the complexity of the organization’s structures and IT and business envi-
ronments and facilitate the integration of strategy, personnel, business, and IT (Goethals et al., 2006; 
Kluge et al., 2006). EA utilization has broadened to the public sector (Guijarro, 2007; Hjort-Madsen, 
2007; Lemmetti & Pekkola, 2014; Peristeras & Tarabanis, 2000). Because of the scope of EA, a wide 
range of users, defined as persons who use and are affected by EA products (Niemi & Pekkola, 2015), 
have been identified (Niemi, 2007). Users include executives, chief information officers (CIOs), project 
managers, enterprise architects, IT specialists, civil servants, and numerous end users (Armour et al., 
1999; Bernard, 2012; Kotusev et al., 2015; Lankhorst et al., 2013; TOGAF, 2011). 
2.2 Problems in EA  
In the public sector context, EA has been used in more than 20 countries (Ramos & Júnior, 2015). 
However, utilizing EA is not easy. The literature mentions several problems that organizations have 
faced while implementing EA programs (Dang & Pekkola, 2016). Seppänen (2009) described that EA 
programs lack EA governance structures and suffer from inadequate resources, and Kaisler et al. (2005) 
indicated that limited modelling tools for managing and maintaining are the main problems in EA pro-
grams. Janssen and Klievink (2012) stressed the problems related to the organization’s network, people, 
  
 
 
process, product, and technology. Isomaki and Liimatainen (2008) described EA problems as an imple-
mentation ability and the governance and structure of the state government, while Weerakkody et al. 
(2007) mentioned the legacy of rigid bureaucracy and a lack of coordination of different information 
systems. Other scholars have described unclearly defined roles and responsibilities (Lucke, 2010; Levy, 
2014; Kim & Everest, 1994), lack of interest among non-information systems (IS) departments, discon-
tinuity of planning, and short-lived commitment from the top (Kim & Everest, 1994), as well as organ-
izational politics, high organizational complexity, outdated EA results, no understanding of benefits, too 
conceptual a nature, the wrong level of detail, and mismatches with the real information needs of EA 
stakeholders (Jan & Christine, 2014; Hauder et al., 2013; Chuang & Loggerenberg, 2013). 
The list of problems with EA is extensive. Although it is important to diagnose problems, we identify 
and understand their root causes. 
3 RESEARCH METHODS 
We conducted a multiple-case study in Vietnam (Stake, 2005) to understand the problems in EA pro-
grams. Three provinces (local governments) were studied as they have different capabilities and expe-
riences with e-government initiatives (Table 1).  
The first province, or case, is a national e-government leader, ranked second out of 63 provinces (MIC, 
2014). The province of about 7 million people has established EA programs with a loan from the World 
Bank  (Nguyen, 2006; WorldBank, 2005). After nine years in 2014, these programs resulted in some-
what limited outcomes—as the objectives were still not achieved (World Bank, 2014). The second prov-
ince has average experience in e-government from the past five years (MIC, 2014). The province of 1.3 
million inhabitants has deployed EA programs since 2010. The third province of about 2 million inhab-
itants has much less experience in e-government. Their EA program was established in 2012.  
These provinces were chosen because they provide better insights as the findings from individual cases 
can be compared to each other (Myers, 2009). Following Stake (2005), the differences and similarities 
between the cases are equally important. Second, the provinces have completed EA programs so that 
experiences in EA programs and problems are available to collect. Third, the provinces allowed us ac-
cess to data (Myers, 2009).  
 
Table 1. Three provinces as our cases. 
 Province A Province B Province C 
E-government ranking in 2013 2/63 7/63 48/63 
E-government ranking group (2009-
2013) 
Excellent Good Fair 
Years of EA experience 9 5 3 
Number of interviewees 8 6 8 
Interviewees Senior manager, 
CIO, Project man-
ager,  Enterprise ar-
chitect, IT specialist, 
EA worker 
CIO, Project 
manager, EA 
worker, IT spe-
cialist, EA worker 
CIO, Project man-
ager, Enterprise ar-
chitect, IT specialist, 
non-IT civil servant, 
EA worker 
 
To investigate EA problems in the provinces, we used a qualitative research approach to gain in-depth 
understanding (Myers, 2009). The data was collected with face-to-face semi-structured interviews from 
June 2015 to September 2015, with people who worked directly in EA programs. New interviewees 
were invited until new insights were not gained (Silverman, 1993). Then the sample size was found to 
be appropriate. The interviews were supplemented by documents, presentations, and newspaper clip-
pings from different state agencies. 
  
 
 
A total of 22 participants were interviewed. They worked at various levels and positions in the EA 
programs in each province. The interviewees included senior management, chief information officers 
(CIOs), project managers (PMs), enterprise architects, IT specialists, EA workers, and non-IT civil serv-
ants. Each interview, conducted in Vietnamese by the first author, who was familiar with the language, 
context, and culture of the cases, ranged from about 45 minutes to 60 minutes. The interviews were 
recorded and then transcribed. Numerous interviews, focusing on the same issues, were conducted and 
compared in order to increase the internal consistency and validity data (Walsham, 2009).  
The transcripts were moved to ATLAS.TI software for detailed analysis. The data was analyzed in Vi-
etnamese; only illustrative quotations were translated into English. A coding unit was defined as a text 
segment no smaller than a sentence and no bigger than a paragraph. We followed Strauss and Corbin’s 
(1998) technique for better understanding the incidents in these cases. Multiple codes were allowed to 
be assigned to a single text segment. We analyzed the dataset through three steps: First, we identified 
problems that emerged during all interviews. All incidents or anecdotes that considered EA problems 
were recorded. They included, for instance, problems related to laws, policies, and politics. Second, 
these problems were categorized into sub-categories and named with appropriate labels. Third, all sub-
categories were grouped into broader categories, such as problems related to the organization or the EA 
itself. All problems that did not result from EA programs were excluded. Table 2 provides two examples 
of how the quotations were coded. 
 
Table 2. Coding example via ATLAS.TI 
Quotation 
Primary 
coded 
(step 1) 
Sub-cat-
egory 
(step 2) 
Broader-cat-
egory (step 
3) 
“We do not have a law or a policy on EA programs, but it is just an 
option in a variety of approaches. This causes problems when we 
work with other agencies. We decided to focus on IT perspectives 
rather than business perspectives” (PM, Province A). 
Law or 
policy Legal 
rule or 
regula-
tion Organization 
related prob-
lems 
“The guidance from the central government is inappropriate in 
our agencies when it comes to practical issues” (IT specialist, 
Province A). 
Unclear 
guidance 
“They [senior management] said that we must deploy a EA pro-
gram in our agency. If we [agency] don’t do it, we might lose 
financial support from the central government. There are polit-
ical issues in the requirement documentation” (Project man-
ager, Province C). 
Pressures 
from the 
sponsors 
Politics 
or spon-
sors 
4 FINDINGS 
We identified four groups of problems related to the organization, EA project teams, EA users, and EA 
itself. Next, these groups are presented. 
4.1 Organization-related Problems 
4.1.1 Organization Structure 
All provinces had challenges with overly complicated structures. They had multiple owners and multiple 
levels of business services that have an impact on the agencies when choosing appropriate frameworks, 
methods, and products for the EA. In the words of an EA worker (province B): 
In our province, we have a multi-level organization and multiple-owner business services, each 
having different permissions and capabilities. Thus, we cannot choose FEA [Federal Enterprise 
  
 
 
Architecture], TOGAF [The Open Group Architecture Framework], or any other approach. The 
only notable way to solve the problem is using our own approach. 
4.1.2 Legal Rule and/or Regulation  
No law or policy enforces the EA programs in the three cases. This means that EA initiatives and pro-
grams depend on individual actors and their background, political views, views on EA, and the environ-
ment in which they work. Thus, the EA programs focused on single agencies and departments, with 
minimum interaction with others, as broader understanding or guidance was missing. A project manager 
(province A) said:   
We do not have a law or a policy on EA programs, but it is just an option in a variety of ap-
proaches. This causes problems when working with other agencies. We decided to focus on IT 
perspectives rather than business perspectives.  
Moreover, as the central government’s guidance for EA was unclear and too general, EA as a concept 
was evidently misunderstood. This misunderstanding affected EA planning and strategy. An IT special-
ist (province A) said, “The guidance from the central government is inappropriate in our agencies when 
it comes to practical issues.” 
4.1.3 EA Objective 
Laws and policy problems affected the objectives of the EA program. When the agencies carried out EA 
programs, the agencies had problems figuring out the objectives for why the government chose EA and 
not some other governance model in the first place. Unclear objectives had an obvious negative impact 
on the EA programs. An EA architect (province B) said, “[Our] objectives for doing EA and using EA 
products are unclear in the sense that the agencies cannot or are limited to use those products in their 
business.” 
4.1.4 Politics and/or Sponsors 
Two provinces (A and C) adopted EA programs because the provinces received financial support from 
the central government or from sponsors. However, EA was not the provinces’ first choice. The sponsor 
strongly influenced the products, plans, and approaches to building EA. A project manager (province C) 
said: 
They [senior management] said that we must deploy EA program in our agency. If we [agency] 
don’t do it, we might lose financial support from the central government. There are political 
issues in the requirement documentation. 
The provinces also seemed to be jumping on the EA bandwagon. They chose EA as other provinces 
were adapting it. This led to an inactive EA implementation as thorough understanding or motive for 
EA were missing. This finding parallels Swanson and Ramiller’s (2004) observation that the agencies 
choose innovations because others have chosen them—but in a mindless way. One EA worker (province 
A) even stated, “The person who does not understand EA at all proposed EA!” 
4.1.5 Cooperation between Agencies 
Cooperation between agencies was one of the greatest challenges because of the inability to collaborate 
due to different points of foci, experiences, models, and activities. The agencies were doing different 
activities in their EA projects. For instance, the agencies did not choose services related to others. The 
agencies were afraid of increasing complexity and risks when they deployed EA. Instead, the agencies 
chose services that would have had an impact only within their own organization. “When implementing 
EA, our agency chose services that affect only to our own business; we did not choose services related 
to other agencies because it will increase risks” (IT specialist, Province B). 
  
 
 
This obviously removed the motivation and agency-/department-level need for cooperation, which could 
have been needed at the national level. 
4.2 EA Programs’ Team-related Problems 
4.2.1 Formation of the EA Team  
One of the problems was responsibility for the EA programs. If the responsibility was on the IT depart-
ment or on other agencies without appropriate credibility, unrealistic and unfeasible schedules and ob-
jectives were evident later. In contrast, if the EA team had members from different departments within 
the agency and if the team was led by a senior manager, then the EA programs were more productive 
later. Consequently, to improve EA programs and their efficiency, they should be organized and led by 
senior management or by the agencies that have strong credibility in terms of budget, business reform, 
and policies to support cooperation between the agencies. A CIO (province A) said: 
One of the main problems in our organization is the IT department. They are responsible for our 
EA requirements. Yet they focus too much on the IT aspects, not paying enough attention to the 
business aspects. This leads to unfeasibility, for instance, in terms of relevance to cooperation 
between and within the agencies, business services reform, and budget.  
Composing EA teams incorrectly was also problematic. For example, Province A used consultants from 
a developed country as members of their EA team. The consultants then used results from their previous 
projects in another country and applied those results to this province. This had poor results.  An EA 
worker (province A) stated, “Based on their experiences from previous EA projects in [country A], our 
EA teams proposed five key projects. However, it turned out that three of the five projects were not 
feasible in our social-technical environment.” 
4.2.2 Capability and Skills 
The EA teams and their abilities and skills significantly affected the EA results. EA expertise, experi-
ences, background, and views on how EA should work and what its role should be were crucial. In 
particular, as most EA members were from the IT department, they focused on the IT and technical 
perspective. They also had experience with IT projects but not with EA. Under the circumstances, the 
EA programs ignored business services and emphasized IT issues. A senior manager (province C) stated: 
Nobody in our team had experience in EA. All of us have a background in IT. We do not un-
derstand what EA is, whether a human resource, financial issue, what the policies are, and so 
on. We are spending a lot of time discussing the topic. 
Some provinces sent their staff to courses to gain basic knowledge and obtain certificates, such as TO-
GAF. Other provinces used consultants and outside experts to help their EA teams. Unfortunately, that 
combination was usually unsuccessful due to the dissimilar views and the lack of general awareness of 
EA and its expected benefits. This made it difficult to find consensus among the consultants, experts, 
and civil servants on even the simplest details, which caused severe delays and wasted time. A senior 
manager (province C) stated, “When we proposed EA requirements, we strongly depended on the con-
sultants, who actually don’t have any understanding of our culture, environment, and business services.” 
4.2.3 Overemphasized IT Perspective 
Many agencies treated EA as an IT project with a focus on purchasing software and hardware. Because 
this was an easy interpretation for successful EA programs, the managers did not emphasize the business 
perspective. In province C, EA programs were divided into several sub-projects, which were approved 
by an agency that was not involved in the EA programs team. That delayed implementation. An IT 
specialist (province C) stated: 
Our EA program is divided into several sub-projects. Some of them are not approved at all, or 
are approved later than planned. In contrast, they [the managers] approved another project with 
  
 
 
the same objectives as it was seen as beneficial for themselves because of social relationships. 
This breaks down the whole unity of EA programs.  
4.2.4 EA Products 
The agencies used EA products in various ways. This caused concerns about the EA roles in the agen-
cies. For instance, if EA was used for strategy, identifying the factors that had to be considered, the tools 
that should be used, and people who need to be communicated became difficult. The agencies also faced 
difficulties deciding which approach, model, or method should be used for EA planning. In practice, no 
suitable method was found. A CIO (province B) stated, “We are planning EA independently to other 
programs. We learned that from the other agencies, and we chose an international consultant to plan the 
EA because many agencies behave accordingly.” 
4.2.5 EA Planning 
EA programs influence many agencies. Each agency had its own businesses, services, and resources. 
This means that the agencies did not plan their inter-organizational activities or EA programs well but 
focused only on agency-level issues. As a result, budget and resources were wasted, and the quality of 
the EA products decreased. An IT specialist (province C) stated: 
Our over 28 agencies and their over 28 IT units do planning with unequal resources, different 
understanding about the benefits, and with their own backgrounds. This makes it difficult to 
plan because we have to constantly negotiate with the other agencies. 
4.3 User-related Problems 
4.3.1 Users’ Capabilities and Skills 
EA program users are defined as persons who use and are affected by the EA products. When the agen-
cies completed their EA projects, citizens did not experience any personal benefits. This forced the 
agencies to spend time training users and advertising their job. These issues cost extra money and time. 
An IT specialist (province B) observed: 
The majority of the inhabitants in our province live in rural areas with low computer literacy. It 
is difficult to change their behavior when we are deploying public services. We spend time 
training the users. However, the proportion of users who use the services is normally very low. 
4.3.2 Conflicting benefits and willingness to use EA 
Many agencies were involved in the EA programs. When the agencies participated in the programs, the 
agencies needed to share information with other agencies. This was very difficult. This evidently had an 
impact on the gained and perceived EA benefits, reducing the role of EA in the agencies and reducing 
financial support for EA. This caused EA programs to fail in term of schedule and finance. Managers’ 
enthusiasm for EA programs seems to be critical. Moreover, it was difficult to collaborate with other 
agencies as their leaders usually were unwilling to participate in EA programs. The leaders were afraid 
of losing their “lucrative benefits” associated with their position in the agency or society. An enterprise 
architect (province C) noted, “In some cases, we needed a year or longer to persuade the leader and staff 
to change their attitude due to conflicting benefits.” 
Agency leaders and civil servants also were occasionally unwilling to use EA products and change their 
behavior. Instead, they used traditional methods and practices in their duties. However, EA products 
help organizations to improve the quality of their business services in the form of increasing transpar-
ency, reducing time for services, and decreasing corruption. This would consequently reduce the ‘ben-
efits’ of leaders and civil servants. An enterprise architect (province C) stated, “I think that our leaders 
and staff are afraid that when EA is deployed, their roles and their gained benefits will be reduced.” 
  
 
 
4.4 EA Itself as a Problem 
4.4.1 EA Fundamentals  
It was not clear how EA was related to other management practices and approaches, such as CobiT and 
ITIL. In addition, whether EA is suitable for everybody remained a mystery.   
The interviews revealed that if there had been no efficient tools and methods for controlling the quality 
of the EA programs, the results would have been limited. As each agency used its own approach to 
implement the EA, risk identification and assessment were impossible. An EA worker (province B) 
stated: 
TOGAF seems to be too large and needs a business focus, while the  FEA approach requires 
high EA skills and high capabilities in each sub-unit. These are impossible in our organization, 
even in the whole country. Then, we choose our own approach. 
In addition, there was no typical approach for applying EA in the public sector as, for instance, the U.S. 
government uses EA for planning (Hjort-Madsen, 2007), Singapore for strategy (Saha, 2009), and South 
Korea as a means of achieve interoperability, standardization, and reuse within agencies’ boundaries 
(Lee et al., 2013). One EA architect (province A) stated: 
In that time, we did not have a clear definition, scope, scale, level of details, method and output 
of the EA program. In our EA plan, we did not focus properly on cooperation between agencies. 
Importantly, the agencies failed to identify assessment factors, frameworks, and models because EA was 
not used commonly in these issues. This led to inefficiency in EA programs. A CIO (province C) stated:  
Unfortunately, when we made proposals in the planning phase, we did not have the criteria to 
assess whether the EA program was successful and what its level of completeness should be. It 
was very difficult to invent and set quantitative factors so we proposed qualitative factors. That’s 
why our EA program somehow failed in the end. 
4.4.2 Shared Understanding of EA 
All provinces had problems gaining a shared EA understanding among the stakeholders and other agen-
cies, especially in terms of scope, scale, level of detail of EA products, and the EA outputs. One province 
(B) that used EA to digitalize several off-line services to online services did not use EA for planning or 
for strategy because they had other methods. Another agency used EA as a strategy for technical in-
teroperability, because their master plan program conflicted with the strategy. They needed thorough 
control of different factors as they expected trouble and inefficiency during the implementation phase.  
4.5 Summary of Problems 
The problems and descriptions are summarized in Table 3. 
Table 3. Identified problems of EA programs in the public sector. 
# Problem Description 
1 EA basic 
In theory and practice, EA has many frameworks, approaches, roles, tools, 
models, methods, and concepts. Thus, agencies struggling to find appropriate 
factors need to be considered, such as how to control quality, tools should be 
applied, and resources.  
2 
Organization 
structure 
Complex structure of the organization. For instance, agencies have multiple 
levels and several owners for services. 
  
 
 
# Problem Description 
3 EA Planning 
EA teams do not plan EA programs well, such as bonding to single agencies 
with minimum interaction with others, and have unrealistic and unfeasible 
schedules (leading to delayed implementation). 
4 
Willingness 
to use EA  
Leaders and civil servants are not willing to use EA products in their work. 
Instead, they used traditional products. 
5 
Overempha-
sized IT-per-
spective  
EA products focus on IT perspectives, not on business perspectives. 
6 
Legal rule 
and/or regu-
lation 
No laws, policies, or guidance about EA from the government are too general 
and not detailed. 
7 
Politics 
and/or spon-
sors 
Agencies doing EA due to pressure of politics or sponsors. 
8 
EA objec-
tives 
Objectives of EA programs in agencies are very general, and the objectives 
are not stated clearly. 
9 
Forming EA 
team 
The way agencies form EA teams, which are responsible for the EA pro-
grams, for example, some agencies responsible for EA programs are IT de-
partments, and some are combined from many departments; organizing EA 
projects (many projects was managed by others, not EA teams). 
10 EA products 
EA products are delivered late, inappropriately, or inefficiently, or are not 
clear. 
11 
Shared un-
derstanding 
about EA 
Stakeholders do not have a common understanding of EA in terms of scope, 
scale, level of detail of EA products, and EA outputs between consultants, 
civil servants, and experts. 
12 
Inactive im-
plementing 
EA 
Organizations implement EA inactively under the pressure of politics or spon-
sors. 
13 
Users’ capa-
bilities 
Users have low computer literacy or lack the appropriate background. 
14 
Cooperative 
among agen-
cies 
Cooperation between agencies affected by the EA program is minimal for 
sharing information or benefits. 
15 
Ability and 
capability of 
EA team 
Ability, skills, or capability of the EA team for working on tasks in EA pro-
grams. 
16 
Conflicting 
benefits 
Conflict benefits among agencies, leaders, and civil servants. 
5 DISCUSSION 
5.1 Roots Causes of EA Program Problems in the Public Sector 
To identify the root causes of these problems, we used a cause–effect graph that maps a set of causes to 
a set of effects (consequences). This graph was constructed as follows:  
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Figure 1. Cause–effect graph of EA programs in public sector. 
Step 1: Identify relationships among the problems. 
A total of 16 problems were identified (Table 3). Then their relationship were analyzed. For instance, 
when an EA architect in province A mentioned that “one agency, having multiple levels and owners for 
each service, does not help choosing an appropriate product,” resulted in a relationship between Organ-
ization structure (2) and EA product (10). The transcripts and the relationships were analyzed similarly.  
Step 2: Build a cause–effect graph. 
From Step 1, if problem A leads to problem B, there is a direct connection between A and B (there is an 
arrow from A to B). For example, if ‘Politics and/or sponsors’ (7) leads to ‘Inactive implementing EA’ 
(12), we have an arrow from vertex 7 to vertex 12 (Figure 1).  
We recursively repeated this step until no new relational cause–effect emerged. The final cause–effect 
graph is shown in Figure 1. There are 21 cause–effects relations in 16 problems. The relations are 
grouped into four categories: organization problems, EA team problems, user problems, and EA itself 
problems. 
Step 3: Identify root causes.  
From the cause–effect graph in Step 2, we identified root causes that are defined as follows: problem A 
is a root cause if there are no problems (out of 16) leading to it. For instance, problem ‘politics and/or 
sponsor’ (7) is a root cause because no other problem leads to this (in Figure 1). In contrast, ‘politics 
and/or sponsor’ (7) leads to three consequences, namely, ‘inactive implementing EA’ (12), ‘EA objec-
tive’ (8), and ‘EA planning’ (3). We repeated this step and identified the list of root causes in Table 4. 
 
Eight root causes for EA program problems were identified. They included three root causes related to 
the organization, one to the EA itself, and two to the EA team and the EA users. Dealing with these root 
causes is a step toward controlling problems in EA programs. The root causes could be useful for prac-
titioners who are preparing to implement EA programs in state agencies.  
First, the agencies’ organizational structure negatively affects EA programs. This affects EA products 
(#10) and EA planning (#3). The public sector usually has complex organizational structures with mul-
tiple-level services, which is usually problematic (Isomaki & Liimatainen, 2008; Jan & Christine, 2014). 
It leads to inefficient or inappropriate EA planning and affects EA programs (Weerakkody et al., 2007). 
Moreover, multiple business service owners, or each agency having its own business, resources, and 
services, could lead to difficulties for agencies planning and implementing EA programs.   
  
 
 
Table 4. Root causes of EA programs in the public sector 
# Group Root causes Consequences 
1 
Organiza-
tion 
Organization structure (#2) EA products (#10); EA planning (#3) 
2 Legal rule and/or regulation 
(#6) 
EA objectives (#8); EA planning (#3) 
3 
Politics and/or sponsors (#7) 
EA planning (#3); EA objectives (#8); Inactive 
implementing EA (#12) 
4 
EA team 
Forming EA team (#9) 
Overemphasized IT perspective (#5); EA objec-
tives (#8) 
5 Ability and capability of EA 
team (#15) 
EA planning (#3); EA products (#10) 
6 
EA Users 
Users’ capabilities (#13) Willingness to use EA (#4) 
7 Conflicting benefits (#16) Willingness to use EA (#4) 
8 
EA itself EA basis (#1) 
Shared understanding of EA (#11); EA planning 
(#3); EA products (#10) 
 
Second, ambiguous/no policies or laws seem to be a root cause leading EA programs, bound to single 
agencies with minimal intervention with other agencies, or focusing solely on the IT perspective. This 
affects EA programs’ objectives. This could be a public sector–specific cause because, unlike the private 
sector where policies can change accordingly and immediately, public sector decisions are more com-
plex and  slower to make (Rose & Saebo, 2010).  
Third, the provinces implemented EA in an inactive way because of pressure from politics or sponsors. 
This clearly affects the Objectives of EA (#8), EA planning (#3), and Inactive implementing EA (#12). 
This finding was supported by Iyamu (2009), who indicated that organizational politics lead to a lack of 
trust and cooperation, especially among business, IT units, or  stakeholders. 
Fourth, the way the agencies form EA program influences EA results. As EA programs usually affect 
many agencies and many business services, EA cannot be threatened solely as a technical issue; the 
business perspective is also needed. If those responsible for the EA program were technically oriented 
(such as the IT department) or do not consider the business aspect (Espinosa et al., 2010; Hauder et al., 
2013), problems such as cooperation between agencies and unrealistic and unfeasible schedules and 
objectives were evident. In contrast, if the organization had a team with members from different depart-
ments of the agency, and if the team was led by a senior manager (province B), the EA programs were 
more productive. Therefore, in order to improve EA programs and their efficiency, they should be or-
ganized and led by senior management or by agencies that have strong credibility in terms of budget, 
business reform, and policies to support cooperation between agencies. This parallels Winter’s (2008) 
work. 
Fifth, the EA team and its skills are a key factor that affects EA results. This includes insufficient staff, 
implementation abilities, and the quality of the team members, as well as their capabilities and experi-
ence in EA projects, and not solely IT projects, affect not only to their own work but also other projects 
and services, and neighboring agencies. Therefore, EA skills and generic project management and skills 
are emphasized. These issues are also mentioned by Hauder et al. (2013), Chuang and Loggerenberg 
(2013), Isomaki and Liimatainen (2008), and Kim and Everest (1994). 
Sixth, end users who use EA products or are affected by them motivate EA programs. The use of EA 
products initiates changes in end users’ behavior, necessitating time for training. In particular, in contrast 
with the private sector, public sector organizations faced low management and adaptation skills for a 
  
 
 
new environment and event computer illiteracy in some provinces. Thus, the organizations spent a lot 
of time and budget training users and changing their behavior (province C). Consequently, at the begin-
ning of the EA programs, the programs’ efficiency and risks are very difficult to estimate but need to be 
considered (Janssen & Klievink, 2012).  
Seventh, occasionally managers and civil servants were not willing to use EA products and change their 
behavior accordingly. Instead, they used traditional methods and practices. In line with  Kim and Everest 
(1994) and Tallon and Kraemer (2007), we argue that this is because they did not want to share infor-
mation with other agencies to increase transparency, reduce service times, and decrease corruption. 
These changes could consequently reduce the leaders’ and civil servants’ ‘benefits,’ demotivating them.  
The last group is EA itself and methods. The agencies failed to identify frameworks, models, and as-
sessment factors that need to be considered. The agencies thus interpreted EA in their own ways, asso-
ciations ranging from taxonomy and methodology to master planning (Ask & Hedström, 2011; Guijarro, 
2007; Rohloff, 2005; Niemi & Pekkola, 2015). This also reflects the lack of a common EA definition 
(Dang & Pekkola, 2015; Lemmetti & Pekkola, 2012). There were no efficient tools and methods to 
control the quality of EA programs in the provinces; thus, the agencies chose their own methods, which 
made it difficult, even impossible, to estimate the risks of their choices. In addition, the problem in 
positioning EA to other management practices and approaches was evident. 
5.2 Specific EA Problems in the Public Sector  
Many earlier problems were new and identified in the public sector context. However, they somehow 
appear in other contexts. For example, EA teams’ skills is a common issue everywhere EA programs 
are introduced (Hauder et al., 2013; Kim & Everest, 1994; Chuang & Loggerenberg, 2013). Yet there 
are also public sector–specific EA problems. They will be discussed next. 
First, there were problems related to organizational structure and governance (#2). Compared to the 
private sector, the public sector has to deal with complex organizational structures and governance mod-
els. This was also mentioned by Weerakkody et al. (2007), who indicated that the public sector has faced 
challenges with the lack of coordination among information systems in agencies and bureaucracy prob-
lems. For example, one service is sometimes owned by several agencies. This means that private sector 
models for governing EA are often unsuitable. Thus, the EA team members, EA objectives, and re-
sources were also affected negatively as the models did not fit the public sector reality. Thus, the EA 
programs were changed, often unintentionally, negatively in comparison to the initial objectives.   
Second, political influence creates problems (#7). EA programs usually cause broad changes in the ways 
the agencies work. The managers and leaders are often uncertain about the success of the EA.  This puts 
extra pressure on the decision-makers whether to invest in EA programs or set its goals. In our cases, 
the leaders played it safe, such as focusing on IT perspectives or hardware purchases. That obviously 
resulted in equally limited EA results. In addition, the organizations were deeply dependent on consult-
ants. Consequently, consultants were easily able to steer the organizations in the ‘wrong direction’ de-
liberately, if they do not understand the environment, culture, and organization well enough. This con-
cretized with non-Vietnamese consultants in case A. 
Third, there are problems that strictly related to legislation and policies (#6). Isomaki and Liimatainen 
(2008) mentioned that legislation is one of the problems in EA programs in the public sector. For exam-
ple, if a private sector organization needs a policy that is related to its multiple departments, such deci-
sions can easy be made quickly. In contrast, the public sector has a long “delay” time, and may even be 
even unable to change. This affects the EA results. Our experiences was similar.  
Fourth, users’ readiness (#13) to adapt EA products had a strong impact in our cases. Computer illiter-
acy, low learning ability, and the lack of modern technologies were severe issues. This is partly a public 
sector–specific issue and partly a developing country–specific issue. All this implies that the users found 
it hard to change their behavior. As a result, the EA programs spent time and budget training users. This 
furthermore led the EA program to miss its objectives. 
  
 
 
6 CONCLUSION 
In this paper, we studied public sector EA program problems and their root causes. The data collected 
from three Vietnamese cases with different EA experiences, understanding, and backgrounds provides 
more insights into EA programs. As a result, we have identified eight root causes of EA problems, with 
several different secondary consequences. Therefore, if the activities are targeted only to the conse-
quences and not the root causes, the problems will keep re-emerging. This analysis, although often par-
alleled in the existing literature, has not been previously presented.   
Our paper thus contributes to research by providing the first versions of root causes and some specific 
problems with EA programs in the public sector. These eight root causes will help practitioners when 
they implement EA programs. For researchers, understanding the root causes provides deeper under-
standing of the complex EA phenomenon, with potential new research avenues, for example, how to 
avoid different root causes, how to consider them in EA methods and practices, and how to apply dif-
ferent theories (and what those would be) in studying complex organizational settings. Public sector–
specific root causes such as political influence, end users’ readiness, organizational structures and gov-
ernance mechanisms, and legislation and policies are examples of such issues that have been studied 
little in the EA (and IS) literature.  
The paper has several limitations. The case study was based on only a single country, its public sector, 
and three provinces. Therefore, the root causes and individual problems might be different elsewhere. 
However, as the literature largely parallels our findings, we believe no major changes would occur, no 
matter whether the root causes are transferred to different contexts or countries. However, as case study 
research provides only a glimpse to the general phenomena, more research is definitely needed, for 
example on central governments and other countries. 
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